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ethics rather than to conform to the casuistic ~~rali_ty ·:legislate, 
the Supreme Court; and finally with our active parti~IpatiOn 1? these e 
we achieved recognition and acceptance by the hierarchy m our n 
members of the lay apostolate. 
In conclusion J wish to take this opportunit~ to extend my gr 
thanks to Bishop Lohmuller, our Episcopal Advisor, Father Schere1 
Moderator, Bob Herzog, our Executive Secretary an~ to all my_ f 
officers and members of the Board of Directors for their cooperat10 1 
dedication to the service of the Federation. 
Finally, 1 wish to reiterate my si~cere thanks_ for the many heart 
communications which I have received as President. 
Sincerely yours, in Christ, 
Charles A. Bauda, M.D. 
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The Retarded and. 
·The Criteria for the Human 
Stanley Hauerwas 
The author is a professor of 
theological studies at Notre Dame 
Unive rsity . RecenLiy he was on sab-
batical leave at The Joseph and 
Rose Kennedy Institute for the 
Study of Reproduction and Bio-
ethics where he studie d the concept 
of a "Christian medical ethics. " His 
article evaluates the setting of stan-
dards to determine "humanness," 
particularly in reg.ard to th e 
retarded. 
It is often a rgued that the evalua-
tion of the development and appli -
cation of new biomedical technol-
ogy depends on the view o ne has 
of man. The degree o ne thinks man 
is different from other animals and 
in what that difference consists 
seems to be crucial for such issues 
as the prolongatio n of life, the lim-
its or uses of behavior modifica-
tion, a nd the permissibility of hu-
man experimen tation. Even though 
the centrality of o ur view of man 
for such decisio ns seems obvious, 
how the "distinctively human" is 
to be understood and used is a mat-
ter of controversy. This difficulty 
may be an indication that there is 
something mo rally askew about the 
general methodological assumption 
that criteria for th e human are re-
quired for the work of bioethics to 
advance. Fo r this assumption makes 
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us forge t how inappropria te it is 
for the preservation of o ur human-
ity to justify the exclusion of some 
men from human care and concern 
on gro unds that they fail to meet 
suc h ·'crite r ia.'· T he appropriate 
mo ral context for raising the ques-
tio n of the "essentially" human 
should no t be an attempt to deter-
mine if some men are or are not 
human, but rather what we must be 
if we are to preserve and enhance 
what humanity we have. In other 
words the question of the c riteria 
of the hum an sho uld not be ra ised 
about others but only about our-
selves. 
Many raise the question of the 
"d istinc tively" human in an attempt 
to place some limits on what they 
perceive as the dehumanizing po-
te ntia l o f biomedical technology. 
For example, they a rgue that we 
should not try to c reate "better hu-
mans" thro ugh positive genetic ma-
nipulation, as these procedures vio-
late man's dignity and capacity for 
self-determination. For example in 
a recent Chicago Studies (Fall . 
1972), William May argues that we 
should not do what we can do 
because: 
..... man does d iffer, and differs 
radically , in kind from other animals 
and that this difference is rooted in 
his capacity for conceptual thought, 
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propositional speech, and self-deter-
minatio n. It is a difference, mo reover. 
implicitly recognized by the majo ri ty 
o f contemporary scientists and is af-
firmed in a very strik ing way in a 
comme nt made by Willard Gaylin, 
M.D., professor of psychiatry and 
law at Columbia University, when he 
wrote: 'The human being is the o nly 
species capable of systematically al-
tering its "no rmal"" biological syste m 
by use of its equally "no rmal" intel-
lectual capacity.'" 
It is unclear, however, if this kind 
o f appeal to the "distinctively" hu-
ma n is sufficient to place limita-
tio ns on o ur technological powers. 
Fo r example, many justify greate r 
scientific manipulation by appeal-
ing to similar conceptions of man 
as the being open to consta nt sel f-
modificatio n through our capacity 
fo r self-determination . 
Inhumane Treatment 
Both sides of this de bate fail to 
notice tha t their understanding of 
the "dis tinctive ly" human embodies 
values that warrant inhumane treat-
ment toward some in our society 
because they do not comply with 
suc h c rite ria. In their enthusiasm 
to assert the dignity of ma n as either 
enha nced or destroyed by tech-
nology , they formulate criteria of 
the hum an that appear in our c ul-
tura l context as an ideology fo r the 
strong. For example, such c rite ria 
clearly e mbody our assumptio n that 
ma n's rational and cognitive a bility 
is what ma kes us human. Yet this 
belief is the basis _for the inhumane 
treatme nt and care our society pro-
vides fo r the retarded, as we assume 
suc h people are fundamenta lly oth-
e r than and foreign to the human 
community . Our responsibility to 
them extends to keeping them alive, 
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but humanizing care beyond ur-
ing the ir survival is simply no ·ar-
ranteed since they lack the en-
tia! conditio ns to claim the are 
provided fo r those tha t a re . ully 
human ." Such treatment tra!- tlly 
becomes a self-fulfilling pro. ~cy 
as we dehumanize them th ugh 
impersonal and institutional uel-
ty o r , in some ways even m de-
structive, the smothering C<! of 
pity. Not to be able to think . we 
think, to talk as we talk , or to ) as 
we do is to forfeit one's right · be 
treated with respect due to ar her 
hum an. 
The presence of the re ded 
serves as a significant ·test c< for 
a ny a tte mpt to dete rmine th ·dis-
tinc ti vely" human . For sure any 
c rite ria o f the human that )uld 
justify less than human ca' for 
the re tarded on the ground that 
they fall o utside the purview our 
species is morally suspect. T h per-
verse e ffec ts of such a limited -~ nse 
of the human can be see n no o nly 
in the kind of care we provit · for 
many of the retarded in our s· :iety 
but wi th the stigm a we ·ass .: iate 
with re tardation . T o desc ribe ,me-
one as re tarded is not a tee 'l ical 
decision based on neutra l ~ enti-
fic d a ta a nd a nalysis; the c oteria 
that de te rmine re tardatio n ha '.: less 
to do with the " weakness·· 1 1 the 
re ta rded than with the com r lexity 
of the de mands of o ur soci~t y as 
well as o ur to le rance of de .. wtion. 
In a socie ty already so in hum ane. 
we can ill afford to e nshrine our 
inhumanity in formal criteria that 
putatively are presented to prevent 
technology's e nc roachment o n the 
"essentially" human. 
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Thts argument can be made in a 
less dramatic way by po inting out 
that the criteria o f the dis tinc tive ly 
human are no t simply a list o f e m-
pirical characte ristics. The no tion 
of the human is a conceptualization 
that makes meaningful o r be tte r in-
telligible why we associate certain 
empirical features with be ing hu-
man at a ll. In other words the evi-
dence for our particular unde r-
standing of the human is de pe nd ent 
on prior conceptual and normative 
commitments that must be justified 
philosophically and ethically , s ince 
it cannot be assumed that the "em-
pirical" conditions we have lea rned 
to associate with be ing man are 
nece~sary to the huma n concep-
tually and normatively understood. 
As James Gustafson has said , "A 
pre-judgment about what is and is 
not 'truly human' probably lurks 
in the judgment about what data to 
use in desc ribin g the hum a n ." 
Therefore, to raise the questio n o f 
the criteria o f the human is not 
first an empirical question, but a 
conceptual-mo ral claim about how 
the nature of man sho uld be und er-
Stood. We wrongly assume that 
what our eyes pe rceive as "normal" 
is what we should morally unde r-
stand men to be qua human. The 
presence of the re tarded helps us 
f~el the oddness and the problema-
~Jc nature of this assumption a nd 
Its attendent ethical implications. 
Fletcher 
The significance of this argument 
~an be illustrated by contrasting 
It with Joseph Fletcher's attempt 
to provide the biomedica l decision 
maker with a profile of the human 
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in opera tio nal terms. (The Hastings 
Center Report, Nov., 1972). Flet-
c her's " pro file" includes fifteen posi-
tive and five negative propositions 
that are meant to provide neces-
sary and suffic ie nt grounds fo r at-
tributing the sta tus o f human to 
a nother. To be man we must be 
capa ble of self-awareness, sell-con-
tro l, have a sense of time, futurity 
and past, be capable of re lating to 
o thers, show concern fo r others, be 
able to communicate, exert contro l 
over o ur existence, be c urio us, be 
o pen to c hanges, have a pro pe r bal-
a nce o f rationality a nd feeling, and 
have a unique identity. Negatively, 
men are no t a ny of the fo llowing: 
a nti-artific ial , essentially pa re nts, 
sexual, worshipers, o r a bundle of 
rights. I am sure each o f us will 
have o ur special pro ble m with o ne 
o r mo re of these c rite ria especially 
as some seem to make recomme n-
dations about how to be a good or 
mature man rathe r that the minimal 
c onditions necessary to be a man . 
Howeve r it is not my purpose to 
try to evaluate each of these "cri-
te ria" separately, as I am interested 
in trying to make a more gene ral 
po int concerning the vagueness of 
this list. For Fletcher cla ims to 
have developed a list of "ope ra-
tio nal" crite ria that a re e mpirically 
specifiable , but all the conditions 
listed have o nly the vaguest empiri-
cal correlates. For example, what 
"empirical" signs could be given as 
a necessary warrant to de mo nstrate 
that someone had control over him-
self that wo uld be useful to the 
doctor? 
The issue is complicated by Fle t-
cher's failure to distinguish be tween 
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faith in the Stanford-Binet test s ce 
c rite ria that are necessary and those 
that are sufficient to determine 
the human. For example, if a criter-
io n such as having a prope r balance 
between rationality and feeling is a 
necessary condition for being hu-
man . then I suspect some of us are 
in perpetual peril of losing our sta-
tus as humans. However, Fletche r 
does identify minimal inte lligence 
provided by the neo-cortical fun c-
tion as the necessary empirical con-
d itio n on which a ll these other char-
acteristics depend. " In a way." he 
says, "this is the cardinal indica to r. 
the o ne all the othe rs are hinged 
upo n. Before cerebration is in play. 
o r w ith its end, in the absence o f 
the synthesizing func tion of the 
cerebral cortex, the person is no n-
existent. Such individuals are ob-
jects but not subjects." (p. 3) Flet-
che r's emphasis on this aspect of 
o ur physiology rests on his assump-
tio n that to be human is to be ration-
al, or in his language, "Homo is 
indeed sapiens, in order to be homo. 
The ratio, in ano the r turn of speech , 
is what makes a pe rson of the vita. 
Mere biological life, before mini-
mal intelligence is achieved o r after 
it is lost irretrievably, is without per-
sonal status." (p. l) Thus for F let-
cher any individual who falls below 
the I.Q. 4Q-mark in a Stanford-Bi net 
test is "questionably a person," and 
if you score 20 or below you are not 
a person. 
it is extremely unclear what su a 
test measures (even psycholo sts 
are not all sure what intelligt ce 
involves or how the Stanford-£ tet 
relates to intelligence) . There re, 
even on e mpirical grounds it i• tot 
clear that the o ne operational rit-
erion Fletc he r gives to mar~ ff 
the human js anything less than ··bi-
trary . More troublesome than his 
is what empirical features Fie 1er 
wo uld associate with the abse n · of 
neo-cortical function, since it 1 uld 
involve anything from the loss an 
EEG to the beginnings o f se ; ity. 
Fle tche r seems to base his po ion 
in this respect on the assum ion 
that activities such as instru n ntal 
learning and cognition resio en-
tire ly in the neo-cortext, b u this 
has no t yet been decisively tab· 
lished. Of course, no one ' luld 
wish to deny the significan of 
the neo-cortext for o ur beh Jior. 
yet we should at least be awaJ that 
the ide ntification of brain an< .. n ind 
is fraught with philosophic<l and 
empirical difficulties . Rece1 • re-
search suggests that we mt t be 
careful how we draw the disti ction 
between body and mind s i ..:e it 
may be that our spirit and in1 1vidu· 
ali ty is more dependent on mere 
biological or bodily processes than 
we had tho ught. 
Purpose of Criteria 
Before raising the more substan-
tive issues about Fletcher's position, 
there are some empirical issues that 
sho uld be considered. It is interest-
ing that Fletcher places such great 
M ore substantively it can be 
asked what purpose Fletche r's cri-
teria are to serve - that is, what con-
c lusions should be drawn fro m them 
and what tasks should we try to 
perfo rm with them? They seem to 
lend themselves to an inte rpreta-
220 
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. tion that would exclude many that 
are now receiving care as human be-
ings. Should we cease trying to ob-
tain better living a nd learn ing condi-
tions for the profoundly ·and moder-
ately retarded? What should be 
done with the elde rly who are no 
longer able to meet the crite ria o f 
being members of the Pepsi-gene ra-
tion? Should we cease develo ping 
resources for the care of those 
whose intelligence is · no t up to 
coping with our modern society 
because they place a drain o n o ur 
resources while not contri buti ng 
to the services o r a rt ifacts o f o ur 
civilization? 
This "pro file" o f man does no t 
I suspect, provide o pe ra tional cri~ 
teria any doctor would recognize, 
but it is rathe r a statement o f the 
working assumptio ns about the 
value o f human life that are a live 
in our culture. The strong stress o n 
the value o f intelligence as the 
necessary conditio n for all hu man 
a~t~vity faithfu lly mirrors the Joy-
ahtles o f our soc iety. Intelligence, 
~owever, is no t an end in itself, nor 
IS our ability to reason suffic ie nt to 
make us human if being human has 
anything to do with being humane. 
To assert such criteria as necessary 
to be human separated fro m the 
values and community for which 
they · · · exist IS to nsk perversions we 
can scarcely afford in a world that 
already condemns some children 
to · miserable exis te nce because they 
~annot exercise ·'problem-solving" 
Intelligence. We fail to notice that 
=~h cri teria are really goals thro ugh 
htch we manipulate and destroy 
some fo r the good of the "normal." 
The important mo ral question is 
not whether the re tarded meet o r 
sho uld meet "criteria of the human" 
we have established, but whether 
we do no t become inhuman by be-
ing concerned with such judgments 
rather than providing the retarded 
with respect and care. 
Our society's high value o f ra-
tio nality tends to make us fo rget 
that o ur ability to think cannot be 
separated from our nature as social 
beings. As G. H. Mead taught, we 
would never be able to distingu ish 
the "me" and the " not me," the bed-
rock of awareness and reason . if 
we were not graced with the pre-
sence o f the other. This descript ive 
point provides th e basis for the 
more substanti ve ethical claim that 
our ca pac ity to reason rightly is a 
corre la tive of o ur ability to regard 
o thers wit h respect. The use of the 
c rite rion o f intelligence to warrant 
the exclusio n of those that appeal 
and think differently from us is to 
cut off the moral basis of our abil-
ity to be ra tional at all. Put in mo re 
tradi tional te rmino logy, our ratio n-
a l ability is no t the prior prin c iple 
of o ur mo ra l activity for we are able 
to reason because we are funda-
mentally socia l beings. To em pha-
size o ur ratio nal ability separated 
fro m its social-mo ral context is 
to intellectualize arbitrarily the 
power o f cognition and language. 
Being Human 
T o be a man is to be able to per-
ceive and respond to other men 
with recognitio n of care. It is un-
c lear to me what e mpirical criteria 
a re correlative of this unde rstand-
ing o f man since the forms of re-
221 
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spo nse a re rich and va ried. That 
we need to develop some empirical 
rules of thumb to check our arbi-
trariness in some o f the hard c ases 
occasioned by our increased tec h-
nological skill is no t in questio n. 
As Eric Cassell suggests , "The func-
tion o f mo rality in medicine is no 
lo nger simply to protect the weak 
and the sic k from indifference o r 
venality , but to protect them also 
fro m mercy grown overwhe lming 
by techno logical advance.'' How-
ever, the de velopment of such rules 
o ( thumb must be developed with 
the kind o f e xac tness that such 
cases e nta il, rather than with the 
generality that opens them to the 
perversio n o f justifying o ur uncare 
o f those who do not fit our c urrent 
standards o f " full y human." 
reach out and provide cart or 
those who have no " right" to i• 'ut 
more concretely, as importa• as 
crite ria a re to inform deci ns, 
we canno t make them do a ~ he 
work o f e thical judgment and JU-
ment fo r all cases, since no l er-
ion is going to relieve o r s! J ld 
make less troublesome the b· len 
of dec iding to operate to sa' the 
life o f a severely retarded chi! To 
try to substitute "imperson e~. cri-
teria" for wh at should be the lral 
agony of suc h decisio ns is alre 1 to 
sacrifice mo re of our human it" 1an 
we can stand. 
In this respect, I think a strong 
cautionary no te needs to be inte r-
jected about developing c rite ria 
of the human that will someho w re-
lieve us of the hard choices tha t we 
are confro nting in modern medi ~ 
c ine. Fo r c rite ria that are suffi-
c ient fo r a ll the kinds of cases we 
confro nt will be· so vague tha t the ir 
concre te implications will be am-
biguous at best. Even if you try to 
make suc h c riteria mo re ope ra tio n-
al fo r the doctor by tying the m to 
empirical charac teristics. it is by 
no means c lear that the mo ra l ques-
tions involved in many o f these 
cases will be any more resolvable . 
For eve n tho ugh suc h. crite ria may 
help you dec ide that this life is not 
"fu lly human ," the questio n o f 
whether c are should be given still 
remains , I suspec t tha t we are hu-
man exac tly to the extent we can 
222 
Finally. I think we sho ut, feel 
mo re the oddness of trying to ter-
mine this o r tha t as the criten hat 
makes us human. The con1 ons 
of being human form a far tO\ om· 
plex patte rn to be ever redu· I to 
some thing like "criteria ." r oo 
quick appeals to the myst • of 
being hum an can be but excu ~ , for 
cloudy and sloppy thinkin~ that 
attempts to evade some of th-. hard 
issues we are confronting, bt they 
may also be pro found respo n ·s to 
the huma n sense that ultimatt· v we 
are no t our own creato rs. T1 ne a 
man is to be open to the call o ~.v hat 
we are no t, and there is theref ·e no 
cha nce that our humanity \\ ' I be 
enhanced by excluding fro r our 
ranks those who do not undt.: , rand 
as we. We must therefore app oach 
the attempt to develo p crit\ r ia of 
the human with the humilit '- that 
recognizes tha t we would he less 
than human if we did not recngnize 
that there are limits to what can be 
bro ught under our control. 
Linacre Quarterly 
Definition and Criteria of Clinical Death 
Robert F. Rizzo, Ph .D . and Joseph M. Yonder 
Synopsis . 
Using the 1968 Journal of the 
American Medical Association arti-
cle on brain death by the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the Harvard Medical 
School and the 1972 lAMA rep ort 
by the Task Force on Death and 
Dying of the Institute of Society . 
Ethics and the Life Sciences on a 
re-examination of brain death as 
SP_ringboards for a contemporary 
VIew of clinical death. the authors 
present the ambiguities and prob-
lems intrinsic to these articles and 
concurrently propose an alternative 
in I he form of a \\'Orkin~ hypo1hesis 
for clinical death as it re lates 10 
care of the terminal palient. 
Clinical Death 
With technical progress in the 
care of the sick and dying comes a 
number of problems and a need to 
r~examine traditional presupposi-
tions, concepts and procedures. Ad-
vances in chemical and mec hanical 
means for sustaining life have raised 
questions concerning the clinical 
definition of death and the tests for 
determining when clinical death has 
occurred. Though these questio ns 
have important relevance to a wide 
range of legal as well as perso nal 
November. 1973 
and medical matters, they have im-
media te bearing o n the role of the 
physician in his relationship of 
trust and service to the patient and 
community and on the quality care 
of the terminal patient. These are 
o ur major co ncerns in reexamining 
the definitio n and criteria of clini-
cal death. 
Medical techno logy has chal-
lenged the moral and medical c ri-
teria for determining death . Tech-
nical advances in health care have 
led some to put emphasis on "brain 
death" rather than on heart and 
respiratory cessation as the criteria 
for diagnosing clinical death. The 
stra in of moving from heart and 
respiratory cessation to bra in dea th 
reveals the inadequacy o f present 
medical and moral guidelines in the 
face of an increasingly sophisticated 
technology. Deeply wo ven in the 
c ulture o f o ur society , the re 
e merges the central question of the 
controversy. Are we really inte r-
ested in the quality care o f the pa-
tient and partic ularly the te rminal 
patie nt? 
In the care of the dying, a rede-
finition of clinical death and its c ri-
t e ria wo uld mean that doc to rs 
wo uld withdraw extraordinary mea-
sures for sustaining life much soon-
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